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1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is motivated by a practical problem that the researcher faced while working 
for a Multi-Sided Platform (MSP) in the Electric-Mobility (E-Mobility) industry. The 
purpose of the research is to design and validate a model that contributes to the under-
standing of value co-creation through APIs in the industry context and can be applied to 
companies in different industrial areas but with the MSP business model. 
E-Mobility has been booming over the past 7 years. Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) 
adoption between 2012 and 2018 has nearly doubled each year, with 110.000 cars on the 
roads worldwide in 2012, totaling to approximately 3,3 Million BEVs at the end of 2018 
(IEA 2019, p. 210). A crucial factor that facilitates the wide-spread adoption of Electric 
Vehicles (EVs) - besides BEV attributes like price, range and availability - is the public 
charging infrastructure, that enables long-distance travel with BEVs and reduces the so-
called range anxiety for EV-Drivers. However, the relative amount of public charging 
poles being constructed has decreased in momentum compared to previous years. Total-
ing to a number of 539.000 chargers at the end of 2018, which is “only” a plus of 24 % 
compared to the previous relative growth of 30 % in 2017 and 80 % in 2016 (IEA 2019, 
38-40). 
There is a wide range of businesses like energy utilities, car manufacturers, electric 
installation companies and native EV charging network providers that invest in building 
up the public charging networks. The target company of this study supports companies 
that invest in public charging infrastructure. It helps charge point operators (CPOs) by 
providing a platform that offers tools to manage public charging infrastructure. Further-
more, it offers various white-label applications that help E-Mobility providers (EMPs) to 
offer charging services to end-customers, the EV-drivers. 
Previous studies of Korpelainen (2017) and Säde (2019) have examined the business 
model of the company and concluded it to be that of an MSP provider. Thus, principles 
of platform economics will be used to determine how value can be co-created by the 
multiple sides in the platform ecosystem. Furthermore, a review of strategic measures like 
envelopment and recommendations on how to avoid pitfalls like the chicken and egg 
problem (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Evans 2009) will be incorporated to form a model 
that describes how value is co-created through APIs in an MSP environment. 
The second domain that is discussed in this thesis are the principles and strategies in 
the API economy. Most importantly the positive and negative effects of allowing third-
party developers to create additional applications and integrations that generate value for 
one or multiple sides of MSP actors. 
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1.1 Research question 
This thesis relies on the research done in the disciplines of platform economics and API 
economics. The research goal is to gain an understanding through literature research what 
factors – in general - influence value co-creation of MSPs and the ecosystem and how an 
API offering of an MSP provider – in particular – can facilitate, enable or block value co-
creation. Therefore, the main research question that should be answered through this the-
sis is: 
 
MainRQ: How value is co-created through APIs in a Multi-sided platform environment? 
 
The research question has practical relevance for the case company, as there are different 
views in the company on how open or closed interfaces should be. It will contribute to 
the existing body of knowledge by building on top of existing platform economy and API 
economy research. Therefore, the findings from applying the model in the industry con-
text of an E-Mobility platform provider will contribute to the existing body of knowledge 
in the named disciplines. 
1.2 Scope of study 
To keep the research manageable in the context of a master thesis, the scope of the thesis 
lies on examining value co-creation potential from the supplier of the API point of view. 
In the case of this research, it will be mainly the MSP provider perspective that is consid-
ered. As MSPs however live, grow and perish with their ecosystem, the viewpoint of the 
API consumers also plays a vital role in this research. Having the MSP provider as main 
focus point is not only justifiable due to the limitations of the extent of a master thesis but 
also grounded in previous research in the field of platform economics by Gawer and 
Cusumano (2008), Evans (2009) and Hagiu and Wright (2015), where strategic decisions 
and value creation are viewed from the angle of the MSP provider. 
1.3 Research methodology and methods 
The goal of the thesis is to create a model of factors that influence value co-creation 
through APIs in the MSP environment. The model should be applicable in practice by 
companies characterized as MSP in different industries. Hence the outcome of the thesis 
will be contributing to the body of knowledge and will have a practical use. As stated by 
Simon (1996) “design science attempts to create things that serve a human purpose”. 
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More recently Hevner et al. (2004) introduced a framework and guidelines regarding 
the application of Design Science (DS) in Information Systems (IS) research. Figure 1 
illustrates the framework that will be used as a basis for this thesis. The framework shows 
the interconnection of design science research with its environment. Business needs are 
the input and the applicability of the artifact is the output. Secondly, the interconnection 
of DS to the knowledge base, where existing theories are taken into use to create an arti-
fact and the artifact itself contributes again to the knowledge base. 
 
Figure 1: Design science research framework (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 80) 
Furthermore, 7 guidelines for conducting design science research are depicted in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Guidelines for conducting design science research (Hevner et al. 2004) 
 
 
Peffers et al. (2007) summarize in their research different theories of DS in Information 
Systems to a set of six activities that should be performed: 
 
1. Identification of the research problem and justification. 
2. Definition of objectives of the desired solution. 
3. Creation of an artifact. 
4. Demonstration of the artifact by solving a problem. 
5. Observation of applicability of the solution. 
6. Communication of results to the proper audience. 
 
The activities identified by Peffers et al. (2007) will be used as a structure for this thesis. 
Steps 1 and 2 are performed in the introductory part. Step 3 – the creation of the artifact 
- will be performed in chapter 3 based on a literature review from chapter 2. The demon-
stration of artifact will be performed in chapter 4. Observation of the applicability of the 
solution is part of chapter 4 and will be done through 2 semi-structured interviews. One 
with the CTO of the case company and one with the Platform Business Director. As the 
last step, the communication of the results will be done through this master thesis. 
The next chapter will introduce the theories and frameworks from previous research 
in platform economics and API economics. Those are used in chapter 3 to develop the 
synthesised model for API value co-creation in MSP environments. 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The literature analysis part will focus on two areas: Platform economics and API econ-
omy. In platform economics, the characteristics of MSPs and the key principles that con-
tribute to the success or failure of a platform will be discussed. The theories will be ana-
lyzed critically and summarized into following categories: facilitators, drivers and block-
ers for the success of the platform. 
Secondly, key principals of the API economy are evaluated and synthesized with the 
findings of the first part of the literature analysis. 
2.1 Key characteristics of MSP 
Let’s start with the basic definition of a platform. As the review of prior literature on the 
topic shows, a distinction can be made between focusing on the technical or business view 
on the platform concept (Asadullah, Faik, and Kankanhalli 2018, p. 3). Asadullah, Faik, 
and Kankanhalli (2018) provide an overview of key definitions of previous literature on 
the digital platform concept. 
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Table 2: Technical and business views on Digital Platforms (Asadullah, Faik, and 
Kankanhalli 2018, p. 4) 
 
 
The definitions of the technical view on platforms focus on the composition of the 
software. The characteristics of modularity and extensibility of digital platforms is a 
shared view of Xu et al. (2010), Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013), (A. Tiwana, 
Konsynski, and Bush 2010), Spagnoletti, Resca, and Lee (2015) and Y. Yoo et al. 2012). 
Starting from the research commentary of Tiwana, Konsynski, and Bush (2010) where 
they introduce a platform-based software ecosystem as the extensible codebase for third-
party developers to develop modules that in turn make the ecosystem more attractive. A 
wide range of case studies into the technical domain followed. In their case study, 
Ceccagnoli and Forman (2012) tested the hypothesis if independent complementors ben-
efit from participation in a platform ecosystem in the enterprise software industry. Their 
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findings show that complementors joining the platform ecosystem proved to be more suc-
cessful by having higher sales and a greater likelihood of raising capital from public in-
vestors. 
When looking at the non-technical view on digital platforms one key characteristic 
appears to be the facilitation of transactions between distinct sides of the platform (Pagani 
2013, p. 625). Hagiu and Wright (2015) furthermore distinguish MSPs by the involve-
ment of the platform in the facilitation of the transaction. Figure 2 shows the distinction 
between MSPs and other business models. 
 
Figure 2: Destination between MSP and other business models (Hagiu and Wright 2015, 
p. 165) 
Hagiu and Wright (2015) argue that the direct involvement of the intermediary in the 
sales of a good or service to the end customer makes the company a re-seller instead of a 
platform provider. On the other hand, the ownership of the supplier side makes it a verti-
cally integrated firm. Lastly, a differentiation can be made between input suppliers and 
MSPs by checking if the company in question is affiliated with both sides. If not, the 
company can be categorized as an input supplier. Hagiu and Wright (2015) conclude, by 
comparing the difference between MSPs and the three similar business models, that MSPs 
have following unique characteristics: Direct transactions between two or more sides that 
are both affiliated with the same company – the MSP. 
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2.1.1 Network effects 
An important driver that contributes to the success of an MSP is provided by the presence 
of network effects. Network effects describe the phenomena where the presence of one 
side benefits the other side and vice versa (Katz and Shapiro 1985, p. 424). In MSPs 
furthermore, distinctions are made between direct and indirect network effects1. Direct 
network effects affect the value of the network when the user base of the same side grows. 
An example that is illustrates the existence of direct network effects is the telephone net-
work. The value of having a telephone increases directly with the number of other users 
also having a telephone. 
Indirect network effects, in turn, come into place when the value of the network in-
creases by the presence of the other side of the network. These indirect network effects 
are the focus of several studies (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Armstrong 2006; Belleflamme 
and Peitz 2019) that investigate the influence of indirect network effects on its partici-
pants. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) propose that the existence of strong indirect network 
effects makes it harder for competing platforms to enter the market unless they heavily 
subsidize the supply side of the network. Rochet, Tirole and Industrielle (2003) and 
Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) confirm this theory and agree that subsidizing one side of 
the platform provides an effective strategy to tip the market into one direction. Ultimately, 
the strong feedback loops generated by indirect network effects lead to the conclusion 
that platform markets are characterized as “winner takes it all” markets (Eisenmann, 
Parker, and Van Alstyne 2006). 
However, network effects are a subset of a concept called network externalities which 
also include negative influence through the presence of more users or producers (Shapiro 
and Varian 1999, p. 185). Direct network externalities can lead to increased competition 
within one side of the platform for resources, both on the supply and demand side. For 
example, more EV drivers joining a charging network increase the chance of charging 
stations being blocked by another EV driver. Or on the supply side: The more CPOs a 
platform join, the fiercer the competition will get between the providers of a charging 
service, which can, in turn, lead to a price drop of charging services. 
2.1.2 Engineering and economics view on MSP 
Gawer (2014) intended to form a bridge between the technical and business view on 
MSPs by providing a holistic framework that incorporates both viewpoints. Table 3 
shows an overview of the different views in platform research. Gawner (2014) states that 
 
1 Also referred to in literature as same side (direct) and cross-side (indirect) network effects 
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the technical view, focusing on fostering innovation, and the business view, focusing on 
the competition between platforms can’t be separated as those objectives often interact 
with each other. She sees platforms as evolving organizations that are loosely coupled 
with its agents, following the definition of a meta-organization by Gulati, Puranam, and 
Tushman (2012). 
Table 3: Technological and business view on platforms (Gawer 2014) 
 
 
Gawer (2014, p. 1240) points out three shared trades of all technological platforms, as 
they 
 
“(1) federate and coordinate constitutive agents who can innovate and compete; 
(2) create value by generating and harnessing economies of scope in supply or/and in 
demand; and 
(3) entail a modular technological architecture composed of a core and a periphery” 
 
Additionally, when looking at the scope of a platform Gawer (2014) distinguishes be-
tween internal platforms, supply-chain platforms and industry platforms. Figure 3 shows 
the conceptualization of those three types of platforms. 
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Figure 3: Scope of technological platforms (Gawer 2014, p. 1246) 
It’s important to note that a platform can evolve from an intra firm to an ecosystem plat-
form and vice versa. If the platform provider, for example, recognizes that its interfaces 
are misused by complementors the decision can be made to close those interfaces and 
only provide them to complementors it has a contractual relationship with. Interestingly 
Gawer (2014) mentions governance as a key factor in capitalizing on innovation capabil-
ities from opening up the platform to a wider audience. Types of governance strategies 
(Parker and Van Alstyne 2005) and their impact on value co-creation opportunities for 
the platform owner and complementors (Huber, Kude, and Dibbern 2017; Sarker et al. 
2012) have been part of other studies. Due to its relevance to the thesis topic, there will 
be a whole chapter (see chapter 2.3) about API governance. In the next chapter, an over-
view is provided on how value is created in MSPs.  
2.1.3 Value creation in MSPs 
The previous chapter introduced the main characteristics of MSPs. There have been some 
notations about value creation by MSPs. In this chapter, the previous literature will be 
analyzed based on different forms and views on value creation in MSPs. 
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The examination of value creation by platforms has been part of several studies over the 
past years. This paragraph gives an overview about the findings from these studies. Be-
fore heading into the specifics, an older study that introduces a new paradigm of value 
creation is introduced. Normann and Ramírez (1993) introduced the concept of shared 
value creation that relies on two pillars: knowledge and relationships. The authors argue 
that companies need to constantly increase their knowledge base to reconfigure and ena-
ble value-creating relationships with their customers. They call this pursuit “value co-
creation activities”. 
Pagani (2013) defines a platforms’ value creation in the form of a reduction of trans-
action and search costs. Rochet, Tirole, and Industrielle (2003) and Evans (2009) go into 
the same direction by defining the value that is created by platforms as the enabler of 
transactions between multiple sides that would not otherwise make business with each 
other. Gawer (2014) adds to these approaches that platforms must effectively influence 
the terms of transactions by governance tools such as subsidizing one side of the platform. 
The examination of the effectiveness of these governance tools has been part of earlier 
case studies in the enterprise software industry (Ceccagnoli and Forman 2012), video 
gaming industry (Rochet, Tirole, and Industrielle 2003) and social networks (Evans 
2009). 
Summarizing the previous paragraph, value is created by platforms by 
 
• enabling transactions between parties that would not otherwise interact with each 
other 
• making transactions more efficient through diminishing transaction costs 
• making transactions more effective by improving matching between potential 
transaction partners 
• reducing the number of steps required to make a transaction 
• improving the matchmaking process by providing better search tools 
 
There is a second source of value generation that arises from the engineering view on 
platforms. Gawer (2014) states that platforms create value by enabling innovation and 
collaboration through a modular architecture and the existence of interfaces. Those inter-
faces can be used by customers and complementors of the platform to produce comple-
mentary services and products. The degree of openness of the interfaces of a platform 
provider has a direct influence on the number of innovation resources that are attracted to 
the platform and diminish the costs for innovation (Gawer 2014, p. 1245). 
Despite the positive drivers that increase speed, reliability and likelihood of innovation 
and collaboration, trade-offs through imitation and competition of competitors and com-
plementors arise as pointed out by Pil and Cohen (2006). According to Gawer (2014), a 
platform provider can use governance tools to avoid negative impacts from misuse. As 
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the topic of governance tools for APIs plays a crucial part in forming the model for this 
thesis there will be a whole chapter dedicated to this topic. Chapter 2.3 gives an overview 
of research in this domain. 
The next chapter will provide an overview of drivers and blockers arising from open 
and closed platform strategies. 
2.1.4 Open vs. closed platform strategy 
As discussed in the previous chapter, value is generated by platforms in a dual way. Plat-
forms enabling transactions between two or more supply and demand sides and foster 
innovation through customers and complementors by open interfaces. This chapter will 
focus on the latter by examining different kinds of open and closed platform strategies. 
The technical requirement for a platform to innovate effectively is a modular architec-
ture or how Katz and Shapiro (1994) puts it, a system that consists of individual compo-
nents. As Gawer (2014) identified, a higher degree of openness leads to a higher degree 
of innovation. Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009) describe an open platform as 
 
• unrestricted accessible for third party contribution, use and commercialization 
• indiscriminate in its pricing and conformity to technical standards. 
 
Hence indicating that there are different degrees of openness that a platform can strife 
to, each with individual gains and tradeoffs. Those tradeoffs have been concretized as the 
balance between adoption and appropriability of the platform (West 2003, p. 1260). 
Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009) describe the benefits of more widespread 
adoption as gaining momentum by increased network effects, less user concern about 
lock-in and increased production of complementary goods and services. On the contrary, 
reducing the appropriability of the platforms provider by reducing switching costs for 
users and increasing competition between rival platforms. 
Boudreau (2010) distinguishes openness of a platform by two strategic decisions a 
platform provider can make: Granting access and devolving control. Granting access is 
defined as opening the platform for outside innovation while devolving control is the act 
of giving up control of the platform (Boudreau 2010, p. 1849). While the latter inevitably 
leads to a higher degree of openness of the platform, opening a platform can be governed 
by the platform provider without losing control completely. 
Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009) distinguish the degree of openness in 
more detail based on the interconnected roles in a platform ecosystem. Figure 4 depicts 
the different roles of the platform participants. Starting from the bottom with the platform 
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sponsor as a governing role. This role determines the extent of participation of the plat-
form users to the technology and economic development of the platform and is executing 
IP rights. Second up the platform provider that acts as a communication hub to its two 
distinct user groups: The supply and demand side. For each role, individual decisions can 
be made towards a more open or closed platform. 
 
Figure 4: Roles in a Platform Ecosystem (Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne 2009, p. 
134) 
Additionally, Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009) distinguish between vertical 
and horizontal openness. Vertical openness is described as openness towards the users of 
the platform and towards external contributors. Horizontal openness is described as the 
act of giving up a certain degree of control by the platform provider by making the fol-
lowing strategic decisions: 
 
• fostering interoperability with rivaling platforms 
• licensing the platform to other platform operators 
• widening the platform sponsorship. 
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Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009) furthermore introduce three strategies for 
each dimension of openness of the platform. Table 4 shows an overview of strategies 
affecting the openness of a platform. 
Table 4: Vertical and horizontal platform strategies 
Dimension Strategy 
Vertical • backward combability 
• exclusive rights for complementary products or services 
• incorporating third-party products or services into the platform 
core 
Horizontal • Interoperability with competing platforms 
• Licensing of the platform to new providers 
• Broadening of platform sponsorship 
 
Starting with the first strategy of the vertical dimension of platform openness, back-
ward combability of the platform assures complementors that their applications will also 
run with newer versions of the platform. This area increases in importance if third party 
applications are an essential feature of the platform. However, Choi (1994) connects the 
backward combability of a platform with trade-offs due to higher development costs and 
limitations in the technologic development of the platform. 
Continuing with the second vertical strategy, making sure that certain complementary 
products are just available via one platform has according to Eisenmann, Parker, and Van 
Alstyne (2009) two dimensions: First, the platform sponsor can agree with a comple-
mentor that the product or service is just offered on the platform. Second, the comple-
mentor can agree with the platform sponsor that the product or service of this category is 
the only one that is offered on the platform. The first right of exclusivity leads to compet-
ing platforms being less open. The second agreement of exclusivity leads to the own plat-
form being less open. 
The third strategy of vertical openness according to Eisenmann, Parker, and Van 
Alstyne (2009), incorporating complementary goods or services into the platform core, 
describes the process of gradually including complementary applications into the plat-
form core as the platform matures. This strategy leads to the platforms being characterized 
25 
as less open, due to the bundling of the platform with the prior complementary applica-
tions. 
Moving on to strategies for horizontal openness, Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne 
(2009) describe the first important factor to consider as the interoperability to competing 
platforms. Allowing users of one platform to interact with users of another rivaling plat-
form is seen as a strategic move towards a more open platform. In young markets with 
strong user growth usually no interoperability is desired between rivaling platforms. 
However, if the user base doesn’t grow that much anymore, interoperability is becoming 
an increasingly important factor to consider, especially in markets with high direct or 
indirect network effects. The most important factor to consider is the market size of each 
platform. Interoperability is usually desired between similar-sized platforms. 
The second horizontal strategy described by Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne 
(2009) is licensing the platform to additional providers. This move makes the most sense 
when the user base of the platform has very different needs and licensees can adapt the 
platform to those unique needs. However, this strategy can impose severe pricing com-
petition that can be mitigated by the platform provider by charging licensing fees from its 
licensees. 
According to Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009), a more extreme form of the 
licensing strategy is broadening the sponsorship of a platform. Whereas licensing the plat-
form still retains the control rights of the platform sponsor over the platform core, broad-
ening the sponsorship aims to give up the control rights of the platform sponsor over the 
core technology of the platform. This strategy proves to be effective when the platform 
operator generates more revenue through complementary products and services than 
through licensing of the platform. 
In more recent research, Parker and Van Alstyne (2018) investigate the economic im-
pact of innovation by examining the growth rate of the whole ecosystem depending on 
two decisions of the platform sponsor: Closing the platform to third-party innovators and 
disclosing Intellectual Property (IP). Their findings show that platforms should put their 
focus on designing contracts with third-party developers in a way that reuse of IP rights 
is granted within the ecosystem. This effectively leads to a larger innovation ecosystem 
that – although it limits the revenue the platform sponsor can generate from licensing IP 
– promotes spillovers of innovation that benefits the whole ecosystem and in return the 
platform sponsor. 
2.1.5 Boundary resources 
A widely adopted model for balancing platform control and innovation has been intro-
duced by Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2010) with the concept of boundary resources. 
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Through their case study of the iPhone ecosystem, Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2010) 
deducted a model for governing third-party-development in software ecosystems. 
 
Figure 5: Boundary resource model (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010, p. 13) 
Figure 5 shows the four steps involved in governing third-party development. Those 
steps must be reiterated with every change in the boundary resources, as changing them 
leads necessarily to attracting different types of knowledge resources, which in turn can 
change the dynamics of control over the platform. 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2010) describe the goal of this process as opening 
boundary resources as a player in a software ecosystem without losing control. Choosing 
the option of opening up a platform versus devolving control has been identified by 
Boudreau (2010) as the preferred way a platform owner should operate, as it produces a 
higher amount of complementary goods and services according to his case study of sold 
handheld devices. 
In the first phase of the boundary resource process, an increased need for openness is 
requested, typically by the ecosystem (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010, p. 13). This 
proposition has been confirmed in later research by Bianco et al. (2014). Bianco et al. 
(2014) conclude that boundary resources are created for the innovator, rather than emerg-
ing out of the technical architecture of the platform owner. However more recently, the 
impact of regulations and policy changes, like the second Payment Service Directive 
(PSD2) regulation of the European Union, can be identified as an additional driver for 
companies to open their systems to outside innovation (Borgogno and Colangelo 2019, 
p. 3).  
In the second phase of Figure 5, policies and agreements between the platform owner 
and its third-party developers must be updated to secure platform control. This step in-
cludes revising the terms of service on which complementors can use the boundary re-
sources. 
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The next step involves opening distribution channels to a wider range of users. Ac-
cording to Yoo, Henfridsson, and Lyytinen (2010) attracting a wider variety of knowledge 
resources creates a greater variety of innovation. 
The last step of the continuous process involves restricting certain applications and 
technologies from participating in the software ecosystem. For example, Gawer and 
Cusumano (2002) identified one tradeoff of open platforms that arises if a complementor 
and platform providers’ innovation clashes. On the contrary, a wide range of complemen-
tary innovation can lead according to Gawer and Cusumano (2008) to a more secure mar-
ket position by being an effective barrier for the entry of competitors. 
In later research, Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013) divide the form of boundary 
resources into two distinct groups: Social and technical boundary resources. Defining 
technical boundary resources in the forms of APIs, SDKs, Scripts and Integrated Devel-
opment Environments (IDEs). Those technical enablers are accompanied by social 
boundary resources that in turn focus on delivering knowledge about how to develop ap-
plications using the technical tools provided. Social boundary resources can come in the 
form of documentation, governance rules, incentives or IP. This model has been applied 
and developed further by Bianco et al. (2014). Their findings after applying the boundary 
resource model in a case study show that an additional distinction should be done between 
technical and development resources. Technical resources refer according to Bianco et al. 
(2014) just to the technical enabler: APIs. Development resources to tools that directly 
support the third-party developer in programming, testing, debugging, deploying, and 
maintaining the applications. Social boundary resources are according to Bianco et al. 
(2014) primary endeavors towards transferring knowledge from the platform owner to 
third-party developers. The second function of social boundary resources is the coordina-
tion possibility of the platform provider towards third-party contributors. 
This chapter introduced APIs as the technical enabler of innovation in software eco-
systems. The next chapter will provide a more comprehensive overview of how APIs are 
having an economic impact on software ecosystems. 
2.2 API Economy 
APIs are defined by IEEE (2019) as a way to share information between software sys-
tems. Another definition comes from Berlind (2015) who compares APIs with user inter-
faces, just with different users in mind: software instead of humans. However, the devel-
oper brings still the human perspective into play, which is well reflected in the social part 
of Ghazawneh and Henfridsson's (2013) boundary resource model. 
Figure 4 shows the layers of the API Economy. Starting from the internal software 
architecture that is modular and interconnected through APIs. The first layer indicates 
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that APIs are used internally, or in the context of this thesis, the scope of the API offering 
and consumption indicates that of an internal platform. The second layer, the external API 
ecosystem, is distinguished by offering and consuming APIs solely within companies that 
have a contract with the platform. Following again the definition of Gawer (2014) the 
API offering is open to a firms’ supply chain. The even wider ecosystem means offering 
and consuming APIs without limitations, which would define the company as an industry 
platform. In addition to the ellipses that define the degree of openness of a companies’ 
APIs, Resch (2018) defines the circle of API business as monetization of the APIs of a 
company. 
 
Figure 6: API economy (adapted from Resch 2018, p. 216) 
Figure 4 combined with figure 6 leads to following categorization of APIs: 
 
• Degree of openness: Private APIs are used within a firm. Partner APIs are made 
available to customers and complementors and public APIs to everyone. As 
mentioned in chapter 2.1. an industrial platform is characterized by the availa-
bility of APIs to everyone. 
• Monetization: A company can offer their APIs for free or for a fee. 
 
Gawer (2009) mentions as a driver that fuels the usage of APIs by complementors the so-
called “Economy of Scope”. Traditionally it has been viewed as an advantage from 
cheaper production costs in manufacturing when jointly producing a product is cheaper 
than manufacturing each output individually. Gawer (2009) brings the concept of “Econ-
omy of Scope” to the digital platform world by describing its influence on innovation. 
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Hence, the Economy of Scope in platform economics is archived by joint innovation be-
tween the platform and its complementors under the premise that innovation is cheaper 
by joint production in a network, than by each company separately. A prerequisite for 
effective joint innovation is a modular architecture and the use of interfaces between those 
modules (Gawer 2014, p. 1242). According to Chesbrough (2003), opening those inter-
faces to complementors have mainly two effects: Acquiring outside resources and 
knowledge and also independent knowledge. Yoo, Henfridsson, and Lyytinen (2010) em-
phasize the importance of diversity of knowledge resources in the innovation process as 
a competitive advantage. 
However, there are also downsides to a modular architecture. Pil and Cohen (2006) 
propose that besides the positive implications on a firms’ performance through increased 
speed, reliability and likelihood of innovation, there is the threat of imitation by compet-
itors that distributes those innovations to competitors. There are strategies that can miti-
gate the risk of imitation. According to Lippman and Rumelt (1982) complex system de-
sign limits effectively the imitation capabilities of competitors. 
Gawer (2014) additionally mentions the threat of complementors turning into compet-
itors. These are the main two threads that could be identified through literature research. 
The next chapter will introduce the concept of API governance that includes a compre-
hensive review of mitigation tools and strategies for the previously mentioned negative 
effects. 
2.3 API Governance 
To maintain the necessary degree of control and limit the unwanted negative effects 
over the APIs of a platform provider it is necessary to govern them effectively. There is 
a limited body of research specifically on API governance. However, there is a substantial 
amount of research related to governance practices in platform ecosystems. Two main 
governance practices could be identified by literature research: The arm’s length and the 
dyadic way. 
The arm’s length governance practice is described by Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) 
as uniform rules for all participants in the platform ecosystem. Choosing this type of gov-
ernance style has the advantage of relatively low governance costs for the platform pro-
vider, but can limit the value creation opportunities with some partners, as it doesn’t take 
local needs of certain partners into account (Huber, Kude, and Dibbern 2017, p. 3). 
The alternative to the arm’s length governance principle has been termed by Sarker et 
al. (2012) as the dyadic way of governance. It describes the process of taking specific 
local needs of partners into account and deciding based on those needs what kind of re-
sources the partner can access and the conditions of accessing those resources. According 
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to the case study in the ERP ecosystem of Sarker et al. (2012), taking local needs into 
account can lead to greater value co-creation within the platform ecosystem, but it has the 
trade-off of higher governance costs. Huber, Kude, and Dibbern (2017) suggest two main 
decision criteria for opening resources towards complementors: High impact on emergent 
value-co creation and insufficient resources of the platform owner. 
In practice, there are several tools (eg. Amazon API Gateway; Apigee; Azure API 
Gateway; WSO2 API Manager) available that support the API governance process. When 
it comes to managing a companies’ API offering these tools provide solutions for infor-
mation sharing, onboarding and securing APIs. Key elements of API Management tools 
are summarized by Fremantle, Kopecký, and Aziz (2015): 
 
• Developer portal including API documentation, SDKs (Software Development 
Kits), onboarding guide 
• User management by enabling registration of applications and user accounts 
• Authentication and authorization through API keys 
• Enforcement of specific Service Level Agreements (SLAs) through API keys 
• Monitoring of client usage through API keys 
 
Krintz et al. (2014) identify four additional topics specifically relevant for cloud plat-
form API governance: 
 
• Change control: Versioning of API and policies of the API provider that spec-
ifies the extent of changes to the API and the possibility to roll back to previous 
versions. 
• Policy specification and analysis: Formulation of the degree of openness of the 
API and analysis of the enforcement 
• Consistent policy implementation: Ongoing checks if the specified policies are 
implemented consistently 
• Implementation portability: Renewing or removing modules should not im-
pact the integrity of the APIs 
 
In addition to the individual governance topics, Bonardi et al. (2016) urge the implemen-
tation of those governance tools through organizational roles and processes. Bonardi et 
al. (2016) suggest dividing API governance between three aspects: 
 
• Strategic governance: Includes a plan on how to generate value from APIs, a 
set of objectives and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
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• Technical governance: Definition of the technical architecture and standards, 
monitoring of technical trends and their implementation and following technical 
KPIs 
• Monitoring of partners: Ongoing process of identification of partners in the 
API ecosystem 
 
Complementing the identification of possible partners in the ongoing monitoring process 
Gawer (2014) identified two threats that might arise from open interfaces by partners: 
imitation and competition. Hence, she proposes also two effective strategies for dealing 
with those threads: Closing interfaces and/or enveloping the competing party. The envel-
oping strategy has been initially introduced by Eisenmann, Alstyne, and Parker (2007). It 
describes the process of one platform entering the market of another platform by leverag-
ing its user base and making use of common platform components. 
When looking at the classification of platforms according to scope by Gawer (2014) it 
can be seen that the lower the degree of openness of the interfaces, the lower the effects 
on innovation and the lower the governance requirements are for APIs. Table 5 indicates 
the interconnection between platform openness and the need for more governance. 
Table 5: Mapping of governance tools to openness of APIs 
 closed partner open 
strategic 
governance 
company hierarchy contracts partnerships, 
joint ventures, 
licensing 
technical 
governance 
modular architecture, 
usage of technical stand-
ards, 
design rules 
SLAs, 
monitoring of us-
age, 
rate limits and 
throttling 
scaling up 
monitoring 
of partners 
within the firm within the contrac-
tual partners 
within the ecosys-
tem 
 
When looking back to chapter 2.1.5 where the boundary resource model by 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2010) was introduced, it gives a process view on how and 
why to adapt a companies’ governance rules. It’s based on the design of new boundary 
resources, which are in the scope of this thesis. Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2010) state 
that the process is usually triggered by the need of ecosystem actors for a higher degree 
of openness of the boundary resources of the platform provider. 
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This adds a new dimension to the governance model by introducing a feedback channel 
for ecosystem actors. This feedback channel can be designed in a relatively simple way 
if the ecosystem just consists of internal innovation resources, as according to Gawer and 
Cusumano (2014) the hierarchy and roles and responsibilities within a company regulate 
the information flow. 
When moving out to the partner mode, this feedback should be relatively easy to get 
through partnership managers and regular feedback loops. When governing the API eco-
system and getting feedback from there, more advanced methods of feedback generation 
should be applied, by for example providing forums, live chat or identifying key innova-
tion resources and getting feedback from them. The case study of Bianco et al. (2014) 
furthermore emphasizes the importance of short feedback loops to avoid frustration on 
the API consumer side. 
Another approach to designing the API offering of a company was introduced by 
Boudreau and Lakhani (2009). They argue that the innovation ecosystem can be orga-
nized by the platform provider either with the market or community approach. The market 
approach provides tighter control over its participants by imposing formal rules, whereas 
the community approach leads to more informal governance. Value for the platform pro-
vider is directly created through the market approach by contracts and sublicensing of the 
boundary resources of the platform. Whereas the community approach creates value for 
the platform provider indirectly through increased demand for the platform by leveraging 
outside innovation. Boudreau and Lakhani (2009) additionally recommend incorporating 
mixed approaches. They emphasize the importance of considering the mechanisms of 
innovation arising from the different needs of the diverse user groups of a platform. 
Although using different terminology, Boudreau and Lakhani's (2009) model share the 
same traits as the arm’s length (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005) vs dyadic (Sarker et al. 
2012) way governing platform ecosystems. The market approach requires arm’s length 
governance whereas the community approach should rely on the dyadic governance 
principles. 
The next chapter introduces pricing as an additional way of managing access to the 
APIs of a platform. 
2.4 API Pricing 
This chapter will provide a short overview of pricing methods for APIs. Gawer (2014) 
mentions pricing as the only governance tool for open interfaces. Furthermore, gaining 
revenue from the API offering is directly related to value creation for the platform pro-
vider. Therefore, this topic is relevant to the research question of this thesis. However, 
this chapter will be kept short, because it’s not in the scope of this thesis to define a pricing 
33 
method for an API offering, rather the various options about API pricing will be dis-
cussed. 
Beginning with the first and simplest option, an API provider can choose is to offer 
the usage of its APIs for free. This is a common pricing model for platform providers 
where innovation from third-party developers is crucial and part of the supply side of the 
platform. Examples of these platforms are third party developers of apps in Android and 
iOS. 
The second option for an API provider is to give access to API through a flat fee. This 
approach appropriates some rents for the platform provider. It, however, lacks the neces-
sary scaling that the next approach brings with it. It can be however used if there is no 
possibility to manage and monitor the usage of a user account through API keys. 
The third approach is the scalable approach of charging customers per API call which 
is a common practice used by cloud computing providers like AWS or selling contingents 
of API calls. Webservices like EBAY, Twitter or Facebook usually offer a combination 
of both, a free tier to get started and after the amount of API calls exceeds certain limits 
the user has to pay. 
This chapter is intendedly short and stays out of common software pricing methods, 
as designing the pricing for a digital service of a company would be an entire research 
question in itself. 
2.5 Value creation through APIs 
This chapter will introduce the first instance of the API value creation model for MSPs. 
To reduce complexity, the common approach of depicting the MSP environment as two-
sided markets is used. This means that the MSP is affiliated with only two sides in the 
model. The goal of the model is to answer the question of how (and if) APIs contribute 
to value co-creation in an MSP environment from the perspective of the platform pro-
vider. 
The first component of the model is based on the degree of openness of the API and 
hence defines the ecosystem players that can access the API. Table 6 shows the distinction 
between closed, partner and public APIs. 
Table 6: Potential innovation partners dependent on API openness 
closed intra-firm     
partner intra-firm complementor customer   
open intra-firm complementor customer competitor 
independent de-
velopers 
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The second component is the degree of innovation a platform can capture by providing 
open interfaces. Figure 5 summarizes the hypothesis from Gawer (2014) where she shows 
the correlation between the innovativeness and increased competition of a platform. 
Gawer (2014) argues that open interfaces “reduce the platform owner’s search cost for 
complementary innovators and extend the pool of accessible innovative capabilities that 
will indirectly create value for the platform” (Gawer 2014, p. 1245). 
 
Figure 7: Correlation between open interfaces, innovation, and competition 
The third dimension will introduce the view on value and value co-creation from the ser-
vice perspective and three core processes of open innovation. As Vargo and Lusch (2008) 
argue, all goods and services are designated to benefit the customer and importantly, in 
the context of this thesis, all other parties in the process. Grönroos and Voima (2013) 
introduce a model that depicts the form of value creation between the provider and the 
customer. 
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Figure 8: Value creation model (Grönroos and Voima 2013) 
Figure 8 shows that the provider of a service is just able to create real value by interacting 
with the customer. However, the customer can create value by independently using the 
services of a provider. In Grönroos and Voima's (2013) model the provider is the producer 
of resources and the facilitator of value. 
This model shows a lot of similarities with Chesbrough (2003) three core processes of 
open innovation: Inside out, outside in, and coupled innovation. The inside out process 
refers to the usage of the APIs of a company through partners in different markets, focus-
ing on leveraging the IP of a company. The outside-in approach refers to companies ben-
efitting from outside innovation inside their market. And lastly, the third type, coupled 
innovation, where the company creates partnerships through sharing resources with com-
plementors and other market participants to create innovation. 
Another form of defining the value an API is creating is by following the Job To Be 
Done (JTBD) framework by Christensen et al. (2016). It works by identifying what a 
customer wants to accomplish under certain circumstances. Christensen et al. (2016) urge 
that understanding a customers’ circumstances, meaning what hinders or enables the buy-
ing decision of the customer, needs to be taken into account to offer the right product or 
service to the customer. Consequently meaning that the JTBD framework intents to steer 
innovation in the right direction, which is a fitting definition for the main value proposi-
tion of open interfaces according to Gawer (2014). 
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According to Medjaoui et al. (2018), APIs should be treated as products that solve a 
business problem. Thus, co-creation of value in the context of the API offering of a plat-
form means exposing the right resources to customers or complementors, who in turn 
collaborate with the platform provider to generate innovative products or services. The 
creation of value is facilitated by a platform provider by offering APIs to customers or 
complementors who in turn independently work on innovative products and services that 
open new markets for the platform provider. 
When moving further into detail how co-creation of innovative products and services 
can be examined, a recent case study of Huber, Kude, and Dibbern (2017) sheds light on 
possible types of value co-creation. They introduce two categories of value co-creation: 
The immediate and emergent value-co creation potential. 
 
Immediate forms of value-co creation: 
• Extension of the platforms’ functionality 
• Revenue from implementation projects 
• License fees 
 
Emergent forms of value-co creation: 
• Potential new future customers 
• Potential to better serve existing and future customer needs 
 
To conclude the third dimension of the value creation model through APIs the platform 
provider must provide APIs that get the customers' job done. According to Christensen et 
al. (2016), the requirement for getting the job done is knowing the customer. This can in 
turn just be accomplished in the industry context. Thus, this dimension will be reintro-
duced in the practical application part of the model. 
However, increasingly open interfaces must be governed carefully. As Pil and Cohen 
(2006) identified, there is the threat of imitation and competition that negatively influ-
ences the value gained from innovation. 
Table 7 summarizes the driving forces towards a more open or closed API strategy of 
an MSP. The facilitators list the entry ticket to the API economy, a modular architecture 
that is interconnected through internal APIs. If this condition is met, the platform provider 
can decide if and how far to move into the next circle of the supply chain or partner APIs 
or even further to the industry or open API ecosystem. The positive drivers show an over-
view of the drivers that let the MSP move to a more open API strategy. The blockers list 
all the negative drivers that limit the API offering of a platform and suggest a more closed 
API strategy. 
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Table 7: Value creation drivers, blockers and facilitators 
Value creation Dimension Source 
positive additional innovation resources and 
decreased cost of innovation 
(Gawer 2014), 
(Eisenmann, Parker, and 
Van Alstyne 2009), 
(Youngjin Yoo, 
Henfridsson, and Lyytinen 
2010), (Boudreau and 
Lakhani 2009) 
higher adoption rate of platforms that 
increases network effects 
(West 2003), (Eisenmann, 
Parker, and Van Alstyne 
2009) 
less concern from users about lock in (Eisenmann, Parker, and 
Van Alstyne 2009) 
additional revenue stream (Boudreau and Lakhani 
2009) 
negative imitation and competition from com-
plementors 
(Pil and Cohen 2006) 
lower appropriability through re-
duced lock in 
(West 2003) 
limitations to technologic develop-
ment of the platform 
(Choi 1994b) 
duplicate innovation (Gawer and Cusumano 
2008) 
facilitator modular platform architecture (Katz and Shapiro 1994) 
 
The additional innovation resources that build applications and integrations on top of the 
platform providers’ API offering lead to a higher vertical specialization of the platform. 
The vertical specialization towards special customer needs is broadening at the same time 
the knowledge base of the platform provider and additionally helps build relationships 
with customers. This can lead in turn to the usage of the platform in new markets by 
diversifying the user base of the platform and lead to additional revenue streams through 
leveraging on increased transaction volume. 
On the level of technical development, fulfilling all special use cases by implementing 
them into existing applications and services might not be feasible resource-wise for the 
platform provider. However, a higher degree of openness of the APIs of a platform re-
quires additional pricing and non-pricing instruments for the platform owner to capitalize 
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on the above described positive effects and limit the unwanted negative implications to a 
minimum. 
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3 SYNTHESIS OF API ECONOMY AND PLATFORM ECON-
OMY 
The previous chapter sets the frame for designing the API value co-creation model. Its 
building blocks consist of elements of platform economy and API economy research. 
More specifically, a platforms’ characteristics and the various forms of value co-creation 
through APIs. 
When looking at the model shown in Figure 3, which depicts the three different types 
of platforms by Gawer (2014) and combine it with the view on the API economy of Resch 
(2018) an interesting new perspective develops. Figure 9 shows the synthesized model 
that describes the value co-creation possibilities through APIs in an MSP environment. 
 
Figure 9: Synthesized model API and Platform Economics – horizontal openness 
The further an MSP provider moves out in the circle, the more open its interfaces are. The 
more open a platforms’ interfaces are, the higher the influence of innovation by comple-
mentors is (Chesbrough 2003; Gawer and Cusumano 2014). For the context of this thesis 
following assumption is used: If governed in the right way, innovation is always good for 
the platform provider. However, there are tradeoffs like imitation that can outweigh the 
gains from increased innovation capabilities (Gawer 2014). 
According to (Resch 2018) negative effects of open interfaces can be limited through 
a higher degree of governance. Typical API governance tools are terms of service, tech-
nical restrictions such as rate limits and throttling, 
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Following the paradigm that an MSP generates value by facilitating transactions be-
tween the supply and demand side (e.g. Pagani 2013; Gawer 2014; Hagiu 2015) the goal 
of an MSP should be to make the strategic decisions to accelerate network effects between 
the two sides. As there are also network externalities that can be negative, those have to 
be evaluated in the context of the industry. This evaluation will be part of the application 
of the model. 
The next hypothesis is based on the correlation between the degree of openness of the 
interfaces of a platform to the increased need for governance of the interfaces. As theo-
rized in previous research by Gawer (2014), as a platform is expanding its focus from 
internal to supply chain and finally to the ecosystem, the amount of innovation resources 
increases and a value co-creation environment is established. When combining the view 
from Figure 9 with the identified drivers and blockers from Table 7, the following model 
is synthesized: 
 
Figure 10: Drivers and blockers for opening interfaces 
The individual facilitators, drivers and blockers are explained in detail in Table 7. In the 
next chapter, this model will be applied to examine value-co creation through APIs in the 
context of an MSP in the E-Mobility industry. 
41 
4 APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
Following the paradigm of design science research, to serve a human purpose, the model 
should be applied in practice. This chapter includes the introduction to the ecosystem of 
the case company, the classification of the case company and the application of the pre-
viously introduced API value co-creation model. 
To validate the findings, a single case study approach is followed. The research mate-
rial is gathered through a workshop and a semi-structured interview. Due to the research 
area being located in the intersection of business and IT, one person from each area has 
been chosen. The workshop has been held with the platform business director. The inter-
view has been held with the CTO of the case company. 
A semi-structured interview, combined with a workshop has been chosen due to two 
main reasons: 
 
• The theoretical framework consists of independent variables that influence the 
degree of openness of the interfaces of an MSP. According to Yin (1994), a 
semi-structured interview should give the practitioners the possibility to add to 
the theoretical knowledge through practical experience. 
• The second reason for a semi-structured interview combined with a workshop 
is the two distinct interview groups that should bring in two different view-
points to the discussed openness of APIs. 
 
Yin's (1994) proposed analytical method of following up the theoretical propositions 
from the conceptual framework will be used to structure this paragraph. First, an overview 
of the EV charging ecosystem will be presented, partly based and prior literature on the 
subject but also on the practical experience of the researcher. Subsequently, the company 
and its services will be introduced in more detail before following up on the theoretical 
propositions from Figure 10. 
4.1 The EV charging ecosystem 
Earlier research (Korpelainen 2017; Madina, Zamora, and Zabala 2015; Säde 2019; 
Weeren et al. 2018) in the field of EV charging networks suggests several different roles 
in the EV charging ecosystem. However, all contributions so far use slightly different 
terminology. This thesis will use the most common definitions in the industry. Table 8 
introduces the market roles in the supply chain of EV charging networks. Table 9 intro-
duces the market roles in the wider ecosystem of EV charging networks. 
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To stay within the boundaries of the theoretical framework the roles will be divided 
between parties within the supply chain and within the industry. Parties within the supply 
chain have a contract with the marketplace operator. Parties within the industry might 
have a contract with one or several participants in the supply chain or play a vital role 
within the EV charging ecosystem. Table 8 shows an overview of market roles. 
 
Table 8: Market Roles in the supply chain 
Role Description 
EMP The EMP is the contract owner of one or 
more EV drivers. An EMP offers a wide va-
riety of different services to its end-custom-
ers. 
CPO A CPO operates and owns charging stations. 
E-Mobility Clearing House The party that facilitates transactions be-
tween EMPs and CPOs by aggregating 
Charge Detail Records (CDRs), managing 
authentication and authorization and han-
dling settlements. 
Search and Find Provider Aggregation and discovery of charging sta-
tion information 
Smart Charging Provider Scheduling and adaption of charge events 
based on energy, EV and EV driver infor-
mation 
EV driver The party that consumes the charging ser-
vice. 
External roaming hub The party that manages contracts and interop-
erability between EMPs and CPOs in differ-
ent charging networks. 
EV OEM Producers of electric vehicles 
 
Beginning from the core interaction in EV charging networks, charging cars, the involved 
parties are the EV driver and the Charging Station. The EV driver is an individual that 
uses either a BEV or a Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV). To charge the BEV or 
PHEV the EV driver needs the service of a Charge Point Operator (CPO2) who in turn 
operates, monitors and maintains one or more physical charging stations. Additionally, 
 
2 also referred to in literature as Charging Station Operator (CSO) 
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an EV driver has a contract with an Electric Mobility Service Provider (EMP3) that offers 
services like registration, identification, payment and support to the EV driver. 
The interconnecting role between the EV driver and its EMP and the charging station and 
its CPO is the marketplace operator (Madina, Zamora, and Zabala 2015; p. 285). The grey 
marked roles in Table 8 belong to the marketplace operator. As indicated by the multitude 
of roles, a marketplace operator offers a wide variety of services to its B2B market par-
ticipants. This is also the key role of the case company that is examined further in the next 
chapter, where the services will be explained in more detail. 
When looking at the roles in the wider ecosystem, additional market participants can 
be identified. Weeren et al. (2018) suggest connections to the following entities: City 
service provider, Vehicle Service Provider, Mobility Service Provider and Energy Service 
Provider. Out of the four participants in the wider ecosystem, the connection to the energy 
system has been identified as the most prominent (Korpelainen 2017). With the upscaling 
market size of EVs (demand), combined with the increased fluctuation of energy produc-
tion of renewables (supply), there is also a growing interest in using the battery capacity 
of EVs as balancing element for the grid (Asaad et al. 2018; Lund and Kempton 2008; 
Madina, Zamora, and Zabala 2016). This value-added service helps Distribution System 
Operators (DSOs) to balance the voltage level of the power system through dynamic 
charging and discharging EV batteries (Eurelectric 2013, p. 8). Table 9 shows an over-
view of market participants in the wider ecosystem. 
Table 9: Market roles in the ecosystem 
Role Description 
Energy Service Provider Energy supply and grid operation. 
Mobility Service Provider 
Services for EV drivers other than charging. For exam-
ple, parking, route planning, car sharing, car rental 
Vehicle Service Provider 
Information about EV data like the state of charge or 
vehicle failures 
City Service Provider 
Information about local traffic conditions, public 
transport, etc. 
 
The next chapter introduces the classification of the case company and its role in the EV 
charging ecosystem. 
 
3 also referred to in literature as Electric Mobility Service Provider (EMSP) 
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4.2 Classification of the case company 
The case company in focus of this study is a Finnish EV-charging platform provider that 
is operating worldwide and connects EV drivers with charging stations. It facilitates the 
transactions between those two parties by offering white label services to EMPs and 
CPOs. Table 7 shows an overview of the services and applications provided by the case 
company. 
 
Table 10: Services and applications by role 
Role Applications and services 
EMP • Registration 
• Billing and receipt generation 
• Finding and starting charging stations 
• RFID handling 
• B2C Support 
• In special cases, when the EMP has B2B customers like fleets, 
electric busses or car rental companies also B2B support 
CPO • Building and maintaining charging infrastructure 
• Contract with energy supplier 
MSP • Development, maintenance and governance the technical plat-
form, including APIs 
• Customizing of white-label applications for EMPs 
• Settlement between EMPs and CPOs 
• Facilitates connection to external roaming partners 
EV Driver • Registers to one or more EMP. 
• Uses mobile or web applications to find charging stations 
• Uses mobile or web applications to see the availability of charg-
ing stations 
• Uses RFID, mobile or web application to start a charging station 
• Pays the EMP for providing the charging service 
 
As shortly described in the overview of the EV charging ecosystem, EMPs are the com-
mercial contract owner of one or several EV drivers. Through affiliating with the EV 
charging platform provider, the EMP can offer services like mobile apps or web applica-
tions for finding and starting charging stations to automated billing for end customers. 
These services enable the EV driver to find and start charging stations of different CPOs, 
which in turn use the platform to manage their charging stations. Affiliated CPOs use the 
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platform mainly through a web application that allows them to manage smart charging 
stations that mainly support the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) protocol. Through 
the web application CPOs can see different reports and statistics about the performance 
of their charging stations. 
Furthermore, the EV-charging platform mediates transactions between EMPs and a 
multitude of different CPOs within the platform. This practice of mediating access of 
EMPs to multiple CPO-Networks is called in industry terms and scientific literature roam-
ing (e.g. Madina, Zamora, and Zabala 2015). The e-mobility platform has a very open 
strategy towards roaming between EMPs and CPOs in their network. Every public station 
is reachable through a global revenue-sharing model for all EMPs in the network. 
Outside of the platform, other EV charging networks exist. Access to these networks 
is agreed through bilateral agreements between the EMP and CPO, where the latter offers 
a price for its charging service to either all or a specific set of EMPs. Figure 11 depicts 
the business model of the target company. Following the theoretical framework, openness 
towards complementors and other third parties is defined by Eisenmann, Parker, and Van 
Alstyne (2009) as vertical openness. 
 
Figure 11: MSP business model in the EV charging industry 
However, there is not only roaming within the platform but also inter charging network 
roaming, in industry terms called external roaming. There are three main interoperability 
standards: Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI), Open Intercharge Protocol (OICP) and 
Open Clearing House Protocol (OCHP). All of them are Open Source protocols with 
OICP moving to open-source quite recently, in May 2019 (Hubject 2019). 
Other charging networks that are connected through roaming protocols can be seen as 
competing ecosystems. However, they are also complementing the service offering for 
both EMPs and CPOs. EMPs get access to a wider charging network for their EV drivers. 
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CPOs get access to a wider range of potential customers by offering their charging sta-
tions to external EMPs. The case company has implemented the technical interoperability 
standards and offers the possibility for external roaming to its participants. To come back 
to the theoretical framework, the openness towards competing ecosystems is labeled ac-
cording to Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009) as horizontal openness. 
The next chapter will introduce how value is created in EV charging networks. 
4.3 Value creation in the EV charging industry 
The core interaction that is facilitated by the EV charging platform are transactions be-
tween EMPs and CPOs. Let’s look initially at the network effects in place in the industry. 
As introduced in Chapter 2.1.1. there are direct and indirect network effects that 
strengthen the position of a platform. Two case studies on the importance of network 
effects in the EV charging industry have been conducted by Korpelainen (2017) and Säde 
(2019). Both case studies found no evidence of direct network effects on the EV driver 
side, rather the existence of weak direct network externalities derived from the possibility 
of waiting times at a charging station. Similar findings of direct network effects can be 
seen on the CPO side: No direct network effects due to more CPOs joining the platform, 
but interestingly no negative network externalities due to additional affiliation of CPOs. 
Säde (2019) argues that this is based on the geographic disperses of CPOs. 
On the contrary strong indirect network effects have been identified by Korpelainen 
(2017) and Säde (2019). EV drivers and CPOs mutually benefit from the existence of 
each other. EMPs and their EV drivers value a higher amount of charging stations and 
greater network coverage. CPOs value a bigger number of EV drivers using their charging 
stations. 
When looking at the EMP side of the platform, the existence of a wide range of com-
panies from different industrial areas, from large energy utilities to small start-ups, can 
be observed. The same is true for the CPO part. Customers range from single households 
to large energy utilities and everything in between. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the case company offers a standard set of white-label applications for CPOs and EMPs to 
conduct their business. However, the high variety of industries and sizes leads to increas-
ing requirements for those white-label locations. In addition to those requirements, coun-
try regulations like the German calibration law or country-specific money laundering pol-
icies have to be followed and supported by the platform provider. 
On the positive side, having a lot of different complementors affiliated with the plat-
form fulfills according to Chesbrough (2003) an important premise for open innovation 
to produce effective results. 
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However, when looking at value creation from the perspective of the engineering view 
on platforms, the overarching question is about how to form an ecosystem where innova-
tion from software modules benefits the whole ecosystem. Tiwana, Konsynski, and Bush 
(2010) suggest that modules should be available through a marketplace. Ceccagnoli and 
Forman's (2012) case study in the ERP ecosystem suggest relying on the vertical expertise 
of complementors to create innovations. These extensions to the platform solve critical 
specialized business needs but rely still on the technical core of the platform owner. Value 
is facilitated by forming partnerships with innovation partners. 
4.4 Openness of the platform 
Linking back to Figure 10, where the drivers, facilitators and blockers towards a more 
open API offering have been introduced, it is time now to adapt the model to the practical 
environment. When looking and the supply and demand side of the platform two main 
actors have been identified: The EMP and the CPO. 
The EMP as the party having the contractual relationship with EV drivers wants to 
offer its services to a wide variety of EV drivers. The platform provider supports EMPs 
by offering a CRM solution that can be adapted to the brand of the EMP. Furthermore, 
EMPs can get branded mobile apps where their customers can log in, find and start charg-
ing stations. To assist the EMP in collecting money from the EV driver, the platform 
provider offers a connection to a payment gateway. However, EMPs can also decide to 
invoice their customer based on transaction information they get from the marketplace 
operator. 
On the supply side of the platform, CPOs build and maintain the charging infrastruc-
ture. CPOs buy charging stations from a wide variety of charging station manufacturers. 
These charging stations communicate with the cloud-based platform through the open-
source protocol OCPP. 
When looking at the vertical openness of the platform no restrictions towards CPOs 
and EMPs are imposed. In terms of openness of interfaces, the platform operator offers 
currently its interfaces to its supply chain participants for a fee. 
Starting with the first driver, the number of innovation resources that are accessible 
for the platform, in the current setup the API offering can be described as partner APIs – 
so only available for partners that have a direct contract with the platform provider. 
It is a good time to remind again about the scope of this thesis, as the research question 
is concerning the value co-creation opportunities through APIs offered by the MSP pro-
vider. Therefore, the upcoming analysis will be structured always from the viewpoint of 
the MSP provider towards its industry partners and later to its ecosystem partners. In 
addition to that, a distinction will be made between horizontal and vertical openness. 
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Summarizing the theoretical research on this topic, Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne 
(2009) characterize an open platform like this: 
 
• unrestricted accessible for third party contribution, use and commercialization 
• indiscriminate in its pricing and conformity to technical standards. 
 
As discussed in the literature review section of the thesis, vertical openness is defined by 
Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) as the openness of the platform towards customers and 
complementors. As discussed in the last chapter, the platform provider has a very open 
approach towards its supply chain participants. 
 
Table 11: Openness of the platform towards its participants 
Role Role in the platform Openness 
EV Driver demand-side open 
EMP demand-side open 
EV OEM demand-side open 
CPO supply-side open 
Energy Service Providers supply-side open 
 
As Table 11 indicates, the platform is nondiscriminatory in its pricing and conformity 
to technical standards towards its supply chain participants. 
 
Openness towards EV Drivers 
The platform doesn’t place any restrictions on what kind of EV Drivers can join or can’t. 
 
Openness towards CPOs 
The platform doesn’t place any restrictions if CPOs can join the platform or not. 
 
Openness towards EMPs 
The platform doesn’t place any restrictions if EMPs can join the platform or not. 
 
Openness towards EV OEMs 
The platform doesn’t place any restrictions on what cars can be charged through their 
CPOs. 
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Openness towards Energy Service Providers 
The platform doesn’t place any restrictions on what kind of energy service providers can 
participate in the platform 
4.5 Current API offering 
The platform provider currently offers its APIs in two versions: For admin users and for 
EV drivers. The distinction is made based on different user authentication. The EV driver 
API requires an EV driver account and thus a commercial contract with an EMP. The 
admin API requires an admin user account which is attainted by joining the platform 
either as EMP, CPO or in both roles. The authorization, that regulates what services and 
data the admin user can access depends on the role that is assigned to the admin user and 
to what organization the user belongs to. The following table gives an overview of use 
cases for each API version. 
 
Table 12: API use cases 
API version Use case 
Admin API get, alter and insert customer information 
get, alter and insert RFID 
get transactions of EV drivers 
get a list of sub-organizations 
alter station information 
get a list of CDRs 
EV driver API Get and alter customer information 
Get information about the latest charge event 
Get, add and remove favorite charging stations 
Get a new password 
Start, stop and cancel a reservation 
Start and stop a charging session 
Get charging station information 
Add and remove a home charging station 
Get monthly charging history 
 
The current API offering is classified as internal, but some customers have access to it by 
signing a separate agreement. 
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4.6 Design of API governance rules 
The literature review part of this thesis suggests numerous dimensions that should be 
considered when designing governance rules for a platform provider. Each decision cat-
egory has individual advantages and trade-offs. This chapter will reintroduce each dimen-
sion and propose an informed decision based on findings from the literature review and 
the practical context of the industry. 
4.6.1 Capitalizing on innovation 
Based on the findings of Boudreau and Lakhani (2009) two distinct strategies lead to 
value co-creation through outside innovation: The market approach and the community 
approach. As summarized in Table13, the market approach leads to immediate value co-
creation for the platform owner through the extension of platform functionality, revenue 
from implementation projects and licensing fees. Whereas the community approach co-
creates value by potential new customers joining the platform and the premise that exist-
ing and future customer needs are served in a better way. 
Table 13: Market vs. community approach 
Area Value co-creation for the plat-
form owner 
Approach 
Immediate value-co 
creation potential 
Extension of the platform func-
tionality 
Market approach 
Revenue from implementation 
projects 
License fee 
Emergent value-co 
creation potential 
Potential new future customers Community ap-
proach Potential to better serve existing 
and future customer needs 
 
Based on Boudreau and Lakhani (2009) the decision of what approach to favor can be 
made by taking the following three topics into account: 
 
• Which kind of innovation will be outsourced to third-party innovators? 
• What are the motivations of the third-party innovators? 
• What is the business model of the platform? 
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When looking at the type of innovation that should be coming from complementors and 
third-party contributors of the case company, the majority comes from special use cases 
in their markets. Although the platform provider offers a wide range of applications and 
services, special regulations in some markets and high vertical specialization on specific 
target customer groups create additional needs. Examples of regulations in some markets 
are, that the sales of electricity must be reported immediately to the financial authorities 
or money laundering regulations that require the EMP to directly report each sale of goods 
or services immediately. When it comes to vertical specialization different use cases arise 
from EMP customers like fleet operators, taxi companies or car-sharing companies. This 
also answers the motivation for open innovation by customers and complementors of the 
platform provider: It is usually the need to add functionality to the services and applica-
tions of the platform provider. When it comes to the business model, the case company 
operates as an MSP, which leads according to Boudreau and Lakhani (2009) to a high 
autonomy of the innovators. 
Another approach of defining the value co-creation potential through APIs is by look-
ing at the core interaction of the platform and the network effects that support the growth 
of the ecosystem. As identified in chapter 4.3. the core interaction that is facilitated by 
the platform is charging an EV. The charging transaction takes place between two distinct 
parties: The EV driver – supported and having a contract with an EMP – and the charging 
station – built and maintained by the CPO. When looking at the network effects, strong 
indirect network effects have been confirmed by previous studies (Korpelainen 2017; 
Säde 2019). Hence, the value of the ecosystem increases when more EV drivers or more 
charging stations are affiliated with the platform. The pragmatic conclusion, that can be 
deducted from this observation, is, that all use cases that lead to an increase in EV drivers 
or EMPs and charging stations or CPOs have a positive impact on the value of the eco-
system. 
All in all, a clear tendency towards the market approach of governing open innovation 
can be deducted from the type of innovations that are requested by the ecosystem, the 
principal motivation of innovation and the business model of the case company. 
4.6.2 Dealing with imitation 
According to Pil and Cohen (2006) imitation is a threat that arises from modular archi-
tecture. Although modularity spurs innovation it can serve as a building plan for compet-
itors. Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy (2008) suggest that not fully decomposing a system into 
individual modules can limit negative implications from imitation. From the technical 
architecture point of view, Baldwin and Woodard (2009) suggest a tightly coupled core 
with a loose periphery as an architecture principle. 
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Although the degree of modularity only affects the API governance indirectly, it 
should still be considered, especially if the API documentation is publicly accessible. To 
limit imitation by competitors, interfaces to only selected modules should be provided 
whereas interfaces to modules that currently see development investment should not be 
open. Key innovation areas of the case company can’t be disclosed in this thesis but will 
be included as a concept. 
4.6.3 Mitigating competition 
Complementors that are using the APIs of the platform provider to produce innovative 
products and services can turn out to be competitors for certain customers. This problem 
has been already solved by the target company through partnership agreements with cer-
tain customers. The partnership agreements place the customer into the status of an offi-
cial reseller of the platform. This just leads to the problem that the customers of the com-
plementors don’t have a contract with the platform provider. Therefore, it is necessary to 
include this special case to the governance rules of APIs. Although some customers do 
not have a direct contract with the platform provider, they are still affiliated with the 
platform and the same governance rules regarding usage of APIs should be imposed. 
4.6.4 API Governance principles 
Following the premise that the API offering should be as open as possible to benefit from 
immediate and emergent value co-creation and combining this view with the feedback 
circle of the boundary resource model, each API method should be assessed towards a 
specific checklist, answering first the question of what can be archived through the APIs 
from a technical viewpoint: 
 
• Data sharing 
• Integrations to third party systems 
• Application development 
 
After assessing the value co-creation potential of the companies’ API offering, the deci-
sion between arm’s length and dyadic governance style must be made. Due to the limited 
scope of the API offering (supply chain), the only disadvantage of higher governance 
costs can be neglected. However, when moving further out into the ecosystem, the type 
of governance should move more towards the arm’s length governance principle. 
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As part of the artifacts of the application part of this thesis, a document about the evalua-
tion of API requests that represent the arm’s length approach and a request API key form 
is developed. 
Common rules for accessing the API for complementors comprise of following topics: 
1. Each application must be registered with the following information: (dyadic) 
User account name 
contact person 
type of application: (mobile or web application, integration to third party sys-
tem) 
use case following the JTBD framework 
(When [context, situation], I want to [functional goals], So I can [emotional and 
social goals]) 
endpoints that are called 
frequency of calls 
2. The case company will accept or decline the request based on the following crite-
ria: 
 
Table 14: Value co-creation evaluation criteria 
Category Evaluation criteria Value creation 
innovation 
The application leads to an extension 
of platform functionality. 
positive 
The case company is innovating or 
planning to innovate in the same area 
negative 
The case company has covered the 
use case already 
negative 
The application leads to significant 
emergent value co-creation that 
opens new markets or access to large 
clients 
positive 
The application better serves existing 
customer needs 
positive 
network effects 
The use case leads to more customers 
joining the platform 
positive 
The use case leads to more charging 
stations being connected to the plat-
form 
positive 
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competition and imitation 
The application is competing with ex-
isting platform products or services 
negative 
revenue 
The API is monetized, and revenue 
generated through usage. 
positive 
 
The same evaluation criteria can also be used to assess requests for opening additional 
resources towards external developers. As identified in the literature analysis, the main 
drivers that affect opening interfaces to customers and complementors are as following: 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2010) describe as the primary driver the need of the 
ecosystem for additional resources. 
More recently Zachariadis and Ozcan (2017) propose regulations like PSD2 as a driver 
for platforms to open up APIs. 
In the context of the EV charging industry, no such regulations are yet in place that 
would require open interfaces to access charging networks. However, there is the need of 
customers for opening up new interfaces to allow specific applications. The target com-
pany has already a feedback form for normal development requests that can be used for 
establishing a feedback circle for special use-case API requests. 
4.6.5 Remodeling of API offering 
To be consistent with the actual roles and applications in the EV charging ecosystem the 
API offering should be remodeled to better reflect the actual use cases for each role. As 
identified in chapter 4.2 there are several distinct roles in the EV charging ecosystem. The 
roles in the industry context are the following: 
 
• CPO 
• EMP 
 
The roles in the ecosystem are: 
 
• Mobility Service Provider 
• Energy Service Provider 
• City Service Provider 
 
To archive a better API offering in terms of scope the following table illustrates the 
matching of use cases of Virta’s APIs to the services and applications provided to their 
industry partners. The EV driver services are part of the EMP services and applications 
and therefore shown in the EMP role. 
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Table 15: Mapping of services and applications to API use cases 
Role Applications and services API use cases 
EMP • Registration 
• Billing and receipt generation 
• Finding and starting charging 
stations 
• RFID handling 
• B2C Support 
• In special cases, when the 
EMP has B2B customers like 
fleets, electric busses or car 
rental companies also B2B 
support 
• Get, alter and insert cus-
tomer information 
• Get, alter, insert RFID 
• Get transactions of EV 
drivers 
• Get and alter customer 
information 
• Get information about 
the latest charge event 
• Get, add and remove fa-
vorite charging stations 
• Get a new password 
• Start, stop and cancel a 
reservation 
• Start and stop a charging 
session 
• Get charging station in-
formation 
• Add and remove a home 
charging station 
• Get monthly charging 
history 
CPO • Building and maintaining 
charging infrastructure 
• Contract with energy supplier 
• Alter station infor-
mation 
• Get CDRs 
MSP • Development, maintenance 
and governance the technical 
platform, including APIs 
• Customizing of white-label 
applications for EMPs 
• Settlement between EMPs and 
CPOs 
• Facilitates connection to ex-
ternal roaming partners 
• No partner or public 
APIs 
EV 
Driver 
• Registers to one or more EMP. • Part of the EMP services 
and applications 
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• Uses mobile or web applica-
tions to find charging stations 
• Uses mobile or web applica-
tions to see the availability of 
charging stations 
• Uses RFID, mobile or web ap-
plication to start a charging 
station 
• Pays the EMP for providing 
the charging service 
 
Integrations of the charging service or data exchange with ecosystem partners should be 
in principle a desired goal for the platform provider. However, looking at envelopment 
strategies, there might be a possibility for the platform to move into markets that are not 
purely EV charging related. A good example are Parking Service Providers like Easypark. 
The target company can leverage its user base and offer a parking service within its mo-
bile app. But the same is also true vice versa. The company has to carefully consider the 
threat of being enveloped by a third party. 
In the next chapter, the model is presented to industry professionals. The feedback will 
be incorporated into the value-co creation model. 
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5 FEEDBACK AND REITERATION 
This chapter proceeds with the evaluation of the API value co-creation model through the 
generation and evaluation of primary data. Following the DS research methodology, the 
artifact must be evaluated by demonstrating its applicability in practice (Peffers et al. 
2007). The evaluation is conducted by presenting the model to two employees of the case 
company. One from the technical side and one from the business side. 
The first feedback round has been held as a workshop with the platform business di-
rector of the case company. During the workshop, the API value creation model has been 
presented and using a PowerPoint presentation. The main goal of the workshop is to foster 
an understanding of how APIs can create value for the target company in the EV charging 
industry. 
After the workshop, the same presentation has been used to introduce the API value 
co-creation model to the CTO of the case company. Subsequently, a semi-structured in-
terview was conducted. According to Yin (1994), an explanatory case study should be 
conducted when a present phenomenon should be described and evaluated. The goal of 
the interview is to understand if the identified categories from literature and its application 
in the case company are solving a practical problem. Furthermore, the semi-structured 
interview should encourage the participants to bring in their ideas about the topic. 
For the workshop and the semi-structured interview, 45 minutes are reserved for pre-
senting the artifact and discussing its applicability in practice. For the semi-structured 
interview, the same PowerPoint presentation was presented for 15 minutes and after the 
presentation, a 30 minutes semi-structured interview was conducted. The interview guide 
can be found in Appendix I. 
5.1 Workshop results 
When presenting the findings from the literature research and the API value co-creation 
model to the Director of Platform Business, the PowerPoint presentation has been pre-
sented and the participant was encouraged to give feedback whenever something is un-
clear or when the need for a discussion arises.  
The main goal of the meeting was to foster an understanding of potential pricing models 
for the API offering of the target company. During the meeting a decision was made for 
value-based subscription fee with following pricing parameters: 
 
• Monthly quota of API calls 
• Throttling limit 
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Details about pricing have been discussed in later meetings. As all questions about pricing 
methods are out of scope for this thesis, no further information will be given on this topic. 
5.2 Semi-structured interview results 
Same as for the workshop, 45 minutes were reserved for the semi-structured interview. 
The agenda included 15 minutes of presentation from the researcher and 30 minutes for 
the interview with the CTO of the case company. However, due to time restrictions, the 
first semi-structured interview only lasted for fifteen minutes. This was not enough to 
cover the whole interview, so another interview round was scheduled. The second inter-
view was conducted on the 12.12.2019 (Interview CTO 2019). It has been recorded and 
lasted for 30 minutes. The detailed interview guide can be seen in Appendix I. The inter-
view covered the three main dimensions of the API value creation model: 
 
• Facilitators 
• Drivers 
• Blockers 
 
For each category, open questions have been prepared by the researcher that check the 
validity of the model that was derived from the literature research and that has been ap-
plied in the context of the EV charging industry. 
5.2.1 Feedback on facilitators 
Three open questions have been asked in the context of facilitators – which are in other 
words the prerequisite of opening APIs to the supply chain and beyond. The platform 
follows modular architecture guidelines, is however in a transition period from a more 
monolithic approach. The future direction is clearly towards a system comprising of mul-
tiple independent modules. In addition, the company has set API design guidelines that 
are being followed by its developers. When asking for the core capability of the platform, 
the whole platform concept of connecting EV drivers with charging stations is seen as the 
main core capability. 
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5.2.2 Feedback on drivers 
The main drivers for opening APIs to complementors are seen by the CTO as follow-
ing:  
 
“The key motivation is large professional customers that already have a set IT infra-
structure, like CRM, invoicing systems. Offering them a possibility to integrate EV-charg-
ing as one service of many they are offering is seen as an important part of the target 
companies’ capabilities. In addition, traffic management, and smart cities are a place 
where APIs will be used in the future.” (Interview CTO 2019) 
 
The next paragraph summarizes the feedback on the individual drivers of the API value 
co-creation model. 
 
Innovation 
Innovation is seen as a natural component of companies. When looking at the EV charg-
ing industry, from the perspective of is maturity, most companies in the same field as the 
target company are five years or younger. Therefore, the industry is still moving very 
quickly as nothing is set in stone. Innovation is essential for the target company to stay 
ahead of the game. 
Local specialization based on the needs of EV drivers is low. The basic interaction of 
EV-Driver to charge point is the same in all countries. However, local specialization 
based on the country of the EV driver is high when it comes to the areas of money han-
dling and selling energy. There are many special regulations when it comes to invoicing 
the EV driver and what form of receipt is displayed. In addition, energy selling is highly 
regulated in some countries and therefore some special requirements arise. 
The target company wants to be compliant with all the regulations in each country they 
operate, however developing products for every single market is very expensive and time-
consuming. Therefore, the growth of the market in certain areas is used to decide whether 
the target company is implementing products based on local requirements or APIs are 
provided to partners to fulfill these requirements by themselves. The target company also 
doesn’t have enough resources to fulfill not only country-specific requirements but also 
customer-specific requirements. In addition, each requirement and special development 
leads to higher maintenance costs. Special developments that don’t make sense for exist-
ing customers should be built by the customer based on a standardized API offering. 
 
 
 
 
60 
New Market entry 
The CTO sees fleets as one of the most interesting new industries the company should 
offer its services to. One big trend in the future is that individuals will not own private 
cars anymore but use a service that provides mobility in different forms to them. 
When it comes to the decision if the EV charging service should be integrated into the 
complementors service or vice versa, the ideal approach would be to integrate the com-
plementors service into the own service. Reality shows, however, that fleet management 
companies already have their mobile apps and integrations to a multitude of services, like 
showing a map of gas stations and offering a loyalty bonus when fueling up the car at 
certain providers. Therefore, it is unrealistic to incorporate services of fleet providers into 
the EV charging service, but rather integrating the EV charging service through APIs into 
fleet provider applications is seen as strategic more relevant. 
The main disadvantage seen in this approach is that the end-customer is not owned by 
the company, which has the implication that additional services can’t be offered so easily 
in the future to an existing customer base. 
 
Additional Revenue stream 
Revenue generation through APIs is not seen as the main priority. However, revenue gen-
eration through APIs should be linked with the existing product and service offering of 
the platform. This means that if the company is offering a product or service, the API 
offering shouldn’t directly compete with this service in terms of pricing. For example, 
customer management: The possibility to create customers in the system can be either 
done via APIs or a UI. There shouldn’t be any difference in pricing this feature. 
 
Network effects 
A direct correlation can be seen between EV drivers the APIs of the platform. Big cus-
tomers are calling the target API of the target company to add new customers to the ser-
vice. 
There is no direct correlation between API usage and additional charging stations. In-
directly it there might be a correlation by offering APIs as part of the companies’ service 
offering. This can help winning deals with new customers. This leads to more charging 
stations and EV drivers using the platform. 
5.2.3 Feedback on blockers 
The main disadvantage of offering APIs to customers comes from the situation when 
customers want to build their own value-added services, like energy management sys-
tems, on top of the APIs of the company. There have been questions about opening certain 
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APIs to complementors so they can build services on top of them that are directly com-
peting with a premium service offering of the target company. One example that was 
given is about an energy management system that would allow a complementor to control 
the charging power of devices based on input from their own developed system. 
Technical misuse is possible with the current API offering. There has been the case 
that APIs of the target company were called by a third-party system that led to a substan-
tial increase in system load. In addition, the current API governance mechanisms rely a 
lot on customers informing the company about the usage of the API. There are currently 
no technical restrictions in place that can govern access to APIs. More control is needed 
in this area. 
 
Competition 
B2B customers are not competing with the platform. 
 
Imitation 
There is no risk in exposing the technical architecture of the company through publishing 
partner APIs and having the API documentation available publicly. However, a risk exists 
if APIs are available publicly through data mining activities of unknown sources. 
 
Reduced lock-in 
No examples from the past have been identified that would lead customers switching to 
competing platforms. 
Integrations through APIs lead, according to the CTO, to increased switching costs for 
customers. However, if a standard evolves in the future and the partner APIs are compli-
ant with this standard, then this threat of reduced switching costs could come into place. 
Custom APIs don’t have this threat. 
5.2.4 Types of Openness 
Vertical openness 
The platform doesn’t place any restrictions towards EMPs and CPOs joining the platform. 
 
Horizontal openness 
The openness of the platform towards other EV charging networks is described as open. 
The company has connections to several roaming networks. However, in the future, this 
might change, due to strategic reasons. There might be the case where other EV charging 
networks grow bigger, and the position of the target company might change. 
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The horizontal openness of customers of other charging networks accessing the target 
companies charging stations must be closely followed. The logic behind this is that it is 
quite cheap to develop an EMP offering. It’s however much more expensive to develop 
a charging station network. 
 
Openness towards the ecosystem 
So far there have not been many requests from ecosystem partners. Existing requests have 
been however viewed quite critically, as it is important for the target company to keep the 
end-customer relationship and not just a technical service in the background. 
5.2.5 Wrap up 
This part is the most open one of the interview and summarizes the three main points of 
how the target company can generate value through APIs: 
 
1. Businesses can create services that the target company doesn’t want to create. 
2. Other companies can create additional services that are offered by the platform to 
its existing customers. This leads to an increased value of the platform. 
3. Offering limited APIs completely public. This leads to third-party developers cre-
ating innovative products and services, that can be used as a blueprint to incorpo-
rate those innovations into the companies’ own product and service portfolio. 
5.2.6 Implications on the API value-co creation model 
To summarize the feedback, each category of the API value creation model is examined 
in detail based on the interview results. The basis for this chapter is the API value co-
creation model described in Figure 10, which summarizes the drivers and blockers to-
wards an increasingly open API offering. In addition to the high-level view on value co-
creation through APIs, Table 13 shows the individual evaluation criteria that should be 
used to categorize each request of API usage. Table 16 shows each dimension of the API 
evaluation criteria. 
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Table 16: Incorporation of feedback to the value creation model 
Category Dimension Feedback 
facilitators Modular architecture Modular architecture is a goal 
of the company, but not fully 
followed due to legacy rea-
sons 
API design guidelines API design guidelines are ex-
isting and followed 
Platform concept The core of the platform is to 
connect EV drivers with 
charging stations 
drivers Innovation Innovation is seen as a do or 
die category. Attracting and 
capitalizing on third party in-
novation is seen as an im-
portant future issue, where 
APIs play a key role. 
New market entry Ideally, APIs of third-party 
systems should be used to in-
corporate a service into its 
own service. It is, however, 
crucial to know the compa-
nies’ place in the market. 
Larger market players with a 
larger customer base require 
the own service to be inte-
grated into theirs. 
Additional revenue stream Not seen as the main driver. It 
is however important to no 
cannibalize the own service 
offering by offering too cheap 
APIs 
Network effects No direct link between offer-
ing APIs and increased net-
work effects could be identi-
fied. 
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Less internal development This was mentioned as the top 
reason for opening APIs. Cus-
tomers can create features that 
provide little value to other 
customers. Especially mainte-
nance of many different fea-
tures has been mentioned as 
an important factor to con-
sider. 
blockers duplicate innovation Aligning internal develop-
ment with external develop-
ment is crucial. If both, the 
company that offers an API 
and its customers are planning 
to build the same service, a 
conflict in interests arises. 
imitation No threat is seen in having 
open API documentation 
available. 
competition The platform provider hasn’t 
seen that complementors are 
suddenly turning to competi-
tors. This was considered a 
very unlikely scenario. 
reduced lock-in The thread of customers being 
able to switch more easily to 
competitors when using APIs 
instead of ready-made prod-
ucts was conceived very low. 
This could, however, be a 
thread when standardized in-
terfaces are emerging in the 
industry. 
 
The grey marked fields indicate that these items received special importance during the 
interview. 
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5.3 Reiteration of the API value co-creation model 
Considering the feedback from the workshop and the semi-structured interview, adap-
tions to the API value creation model can be considered. Figure 12 shows the reiteration 
of Figure 10. 
 
Figure 12: Adapted facilitators, drivers and blockers 
When starting from the internal API ecosystem, in addition to the whole platform concept 
and the modular architecture the third faciliatory, API design guidelines, have been added. 
The drivers and blockers for a more open or closed API strategy have been rearranged 
according to their importance. Starting with the number one of the drivers: Innovation 
resources. 
 
“The question is not if innovation is important for our company but rather how we 
can be innovative” (Interview CTO 2019) 
 
Innovativeness and capitalizing on third party innovations is seen as the key driver for an 
open API strategy. This is in line with the literature on this topic (e.g. Boudreau and 
Lakhani 2009; Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne 2009; Gawer and Cusumano 2014; 
Yoo, Henfridsson, and Lyytinen 2010). 
When moving on to the next driver, new market entry has been mentioned as another 
key driver for a more open API offering. Naturally, the desired direction should be to 
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integrate services into a companies’ own service. But practically, companies with a larger 
user-base usually integrate smaller services of companies with a smaller user-base. This 
is in line with previous literature, that emphasized the importance of strengthening the 
user base of the platform through integrations by West (2003) and Eisenmann, Parker, 
and Van Alstyne (2009). 
Third up in the list of drivers, and marked as important, is the benefit of less internal 
development. Especially considering the international focus of the case company, com-
bined with various stakeholders on both sides of the platform makes, it is hard to comply 
with every special requirement. This topic can be interpreted as a part of the decreased 
search costs for innovation resources that emerge from opening interfaces to a wider eco-
system (Gawer 2014, p. 1245). 
The last driver, that didn’t receive as much attention as the others, is the additional 
revenue stream from commercializing a companies’ API offering. According to the 
interview results and the workshop with the platform business director, the most crucial 
factor to consider in the commercialization is to not cannibalize the platform providers’ 
own products and services that generate revenue. Similar findings have been identified 
by Boudreau and Lakhani (2009). 
When moving on to blockers, the interview results show that they received, in general, 
less emphasis than the drivers. As number one blocker the duplicate innovation was men-
tioned. It requires constant governance to avoid the risk of exposing resources that can be 
used by the innovation ecosystem to develop products that are already under development 
by the platform provider. This thread has also been identified by Gawer and Cusumano 
(2008). 
The second blocker of reduced lock-in has been discussed in the interview and was 
considered in the context of the case company as a benefit. Partners that integrate an EV 
charging service to their own systems must do a substantial amount of integration work 
and a lack of standardized interfaces in the industry lead to an increased lock-in. This 
point should be however considered from industry to industry and can’t be generalized as 
driver or blocker. 
The third blocker of complementors turning into competitors has been discussed in the 
interview but didn’t receive a special notion. It might be different in other industries. 
The last point of imitation by competitors through open interfaces was not confirmed 
by the CTO. However, a mature enough platform should be able to deal with imitation 
well enough due to network effects being already in place. 
Based on the reiteration of the API value creation model, the next chapter will intro-
duce artifacts created by the researcher. These artifacts include an API documentation 
that is structured based on use-cases, a sign-up form that helps with managing partners 
and governing the API ecosystem. 
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5.4 Creation of API governance and management tools 
This chapter will introduce the hands-on work that has been done during the master thesis. 
First, the remodeled API documentation is introduced. Based on the findings of chapter 
4, EMPs and CPOs have both standard use cases they want to usually cover using the 
companies' partner APIs. Figure 13 illustrates the first part of the adapted API documen-
tation that is structured according to the use-cases of B2B customers. On the left bar in 
the picture, the technical API description is structured under 5 use cases: 
 
• Authentication 
• Integration of external CRM systems 
• Charge card handling 
• Integrate external invoicing system 
• Statistics and data analysis 
 
Figure 13: API documentation part 1 according to use cases 
Part of the management process of the standard partner APIs is a sign-up form that is 
illustrated in Appendix II. The main reason for the sign-up form is to get company details 
(see Appendix II, Page 1) and information of the partner how often the APIs are called 
and what project the APIs are being used in (see Appendix II, Page2). After completion 
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of the sign-up form, each request will be checked according to the evaluation criteria 
introduced in Table 13. 
The second part of the companies’ API has the use-case of displaying information 
about chargers and allow interaction through UIs like mobile or web applications. This 
API is also structured according to its most common use cases: 
 
• Authentication 
• EV driver account management 
• Charging 
• Charging station list and status 
 
Figure 14: API documentation part 2 - EV driver interaction 
In addition to the standard use case documentation, the company has a large set of internal 
APIs. When describing the above mentioned standard APIs, those have been best de-
scribed by Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009) as the market approach to man-
aging outside innovation. 
The second approach described by Sarker et al. (2012) as the dyadic way of managing 
outside innovation requires a different approach. Due to the highly local needs of platform 
participants, a lot of requests arise that don’t fit into the standard use cases. As recom-
mended by Boudreau and Lakhani (2009) a mixed approach to managing outside innova-
tion should be applied in those cases. Therefore, an already existing development request 
form is reused. All platform participants can request the platform provider to be more 
open. Each of these requests is, before opening APIs in a sort of bilateral way to one or 
more of the platforms participants, checked according to the evaluation criteria of Table 
13. 
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6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
During this thesis, various elements of value co-creation through APIs in the context of 
MSPs have been discussed. Furthermore, a model has been developed, applied and reit-
erated in a real-world context. 
When looking back at the starting point of the thesis, the main research question was: 
 
How value is co-created through APIs in a Multi-sided platform environment? 
 
To answer the question a design science research methodology was followed. Starting 
with theoretical foundations in platform economics and API economy a model has been 
built that was applied in the context of the EV charging industry. During the case study, 
one interview and a workshop have been conducted with professionals of the industry 
that gave feedback on the first iteration of the model. The feedback has been incorporated 
in the model and the main findings are presented in this chapter. 
6.1 Main findings 
The answer to the research question is two-folded. One the one hand there is enough 
evidence that open APIs stimulate an innovation environment that not only benefits the 
platform provider but the whole platform ecosystem. Complementors can serve custom-
ers in various markets better than one centralized organization. Integrating a service 
through APIs into another service has a positive impact on network effects and generates 
a competitive advantage for the platform provider that offers easy to use and open APIs. 
On the other hand, a high degree of openness of APIs of an MSP can cannibalize a 
platform providers’ service offering and lead to a negative impact on the revenue of the 
platform provider. It can – in certain situations – reduce lock-in and turn former comple-
mentors to competitors. In addition to those blockers, an organization can also just not be 
ready to open its APIs to its environment, as certain facilitators like modular architecture 
and API design guidelines are not yet being used in the company. 
Therefore, the platform provider must find a middle ground between opening up the 
right resources to the right parties and thus finding a fitting degree of openness. Although 
this step is highly dependent on the industry the platform is operating in, a set of manage-
ment practices and governance guidelines have been identified and presented in chapter 
4. 
The further a company decides to open its API offering, the stricter the degree of gov-
ernance and the higher the effort in managing the API ecosystem is required. At some 
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point, the dyadic way of governing APIs is simply not scalable anymore and the arms-
length governance principle has to be applied. 
As discussed in the context of the case company a mixed approach provided to be the 
best solution. This leads to a scalable standard API offering for the whole ecosystem 
without losing the flexibility that dyadic governance provides for special cases. Those 
special cases, in turn, can be easily adapted to the standard offering once the value co-
creation potential for the platform provider is clear. 
6.2 Theoretical contributions 
This thesis combines the two research streams of platform economy and API economy. 
Both bridge technology and business domains and are therefore relevant for the main 
focus of the researchers' master studies in Global IT Management. 
The findings of the thesis lead to a better understanding of ways of governing APIs by 
taking external stakeholders into account for MSP providers. 
When looking at previous literature, Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009) have 
identified the importance of outside innovation for platform providers. APIs have been 
seen by multiple authors (eg. Gawer 2014; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013; Seny, 
Guérin, and Hosanagar 2011) as key drivers to support an innovation environment around 
digital platforms. This leads to the term API economy that has been evolving during the 
past couple of years. 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of how opening up or closing interfaces 
affect in positive and negative ways the factors that contribute to the success of an MSP. 
Through the possibility to conduct a design science research in the context of an MSP in 
the EV charging industry, several factors like innovation, higher adoption rate and limi-
tation of technological development (see Table 7 for details) have been identified. 
One negative factor, identified by Pil and Cohen (2006), as imitation and competition 
from complementors couldn’t be confirmed during this thesis. In addition, another nega-
tive factor, lower appropriability through reduced lock-in (West 2003), could be clarified 
to be, in the case of standard interfaces, a threat, but without standardized interfaces an 
actual positive factor for a platform provider. 
6.3 Limitations and further research 
As a critical observer might have noticed, during this thesis, the term value co-creation 
describes the creation of value for customers not by one single company, but a whole 
ecosystem of businesses and even individuals working together to offer an optimal mix 
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of services to the customer. This thesis has been mainly focusing on the viewpoint of an 
MSP that orchestrates and controls who can contribute to the value co-creation activities 
together with them. For a more holistic approach, all potential ecosystem roles should be 
taken into account. 
This observation leads also to the first suggestion for further research on this topic. 
When looking at an ecosystem, like the EV charging industry, many potentials players 
are being involved. Conducting a study with the viewpoint of a charging station manu-
facturer or a parking service provider could offer valuable insights into how value co-
creation affects their business model. 
Furthermore, one interesting research stream opens up when looking at the two ways 
of governing APIs: The arm’s length and the dyadic way. This research took it as granted 
that, at some point, the governance and management effort of the dyadic way of governing 
APIs creates too much effort. It would be interesting to see more research on this topic 
that examines the problem in more depth. 
Another suggestion for further research and a topic that has not been discussed in great 
depth in this thesis is the pricing of APIs. When does it make sense to offer APIs for free? 
What pricing models can be developed and how can they be optimized? Those questions 
could provide interesting starting points for further research. 
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8 APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Basic information about the research 
Introduction of the researcher 
Introduction of the API value creation model through a PowerPoint presentation 
Privacy Information 
This interview will be recorded but the record can be deleted 
Names will not be used, but the title 
Can the company name be used in the study? 
 
Information about the interviewee 
Name 
Position 
 
Platform provider interview: 
 
Facilitators: 
Does your platform follow modular architecture guidelines or is it more comprised of 
integrated systems? 
Do you have API design guidelines? 
If yes, are they being followed? 
What do you see as the core capability of Platform? 
 
Drivers: 
General: 
What is the main advantage of opening your APIs to customers? (innovation, new market 
entry, less internal R&D, additional revenue stream, other?) 
How important is innovation for your company? 
Do you have enough resources to work on innovative products and services? 
New market entry: 
What market would you wish your platform to be in? How do you think your APIs can 
help you to get into new markets? 
Less internal development: 
Do you have enough development resources to work on customer requirements? 
Additional revenue stream: 
Besides the previously discussed advantages, how important is it for you do generate di-
rect revenue from your API offering? 
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Network effects: 
Have you experienced that more EV drivers are joining your platform directly through 
API calls? 
Have you experienced that more EV drivers are joining your platform indirectly through 
a complementor offering an innovative application or service that builds upon your APIs? 
Have you experienced that more charging stations are connected to your platform directly 
through API calls? 
Have you experienced that more charging stations are connected to your platform indi-
rectly through API calls? 
 
Blockers: 
General: 
What are the main disadvantages of opening your API? technical, strategic 
Competition: 
Do you see a risk of competitors misusing your APIs? 
Are some of your B2B customers directly competing with you in some markets? 
Imitation: 
Do you see a risk of exposing your technical architecture to competitors? 
reduced lock-in: 
Have you experienced that customers using your APIs tend to exchange your platform 
with another one more often? 
Do you think the reduced lock-in negatively affects the amount of CPOs and EMPs in 
your platform? 
Duplicate innovation: 
Do you see the risk of customers investing in their own development and not ordering 
features from you? 
 
Types of openness: 
Vertical: 
How open would you categorize your platform towards CPOs and EMPs? 
Horizontal: 
How open would you categorize your platform towards other EV charging networks out-
side your platform? 
How open would you categorize your platform towards other ecosystems (MaaS, OEMs, 
Energy Service Providers and City Service Providers) 
 
Wrap up: 
Please share your three main points on how your platform can generate value from its 
API offering. 
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9 APPENDIX II: REQUEST API KEY FORM 
 
Figure 15: Request API key form page one 
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Figure 16: Request API key form page two 
